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philosophically engaging—even for the specialist or scholar—but also
highly readable, written in a way that makes it accessible even to the beginning student of philosophy. As commentator, moreover, Matthews has
a unique ability to both identify and draw out precisely those features
of Augustine’s views which are (alternately) most puzzling, surprising,
distinctive, or remarkable. He has a way not only of bringing Augustine’s
philosophical ideas to life but also of calling attention to their philosophical interest and relevance to contemporary concerns and discussions. Indeed, one of the assets of the book is the way Matthews brings Augustine’s philosophical ideas into dialogue with more recent philosophical
literature. Matthews draws fruitful comparisons (and contrasts) between
Augustine’s and Descartes’s views in philosophy of mind, he subjects Augustine’s account of language acquisition and his treatment of the Problem of Other Minds to a number of Wittgensteinian critiques, he draws on
McTaggart’s distinction between A-series and B-series terms in order to
make sense of diﬀerent strands in Augustine’s account of time, and puzzles over whether Augustine might be presupposing the KK principle in
his account of self-knowledge—and these are but a few examples.
To be sure, there are inevitable costs associated with the kind of approach Matthews pursues in the book. If you want an introduction that
is both broad in scope and fairly systematic in coverage—a “big picture”
framing of Augustine’s central doctrines and texts—then Matthews’s book
will likely disappoint. The book is, as I’ve indicated, topically organized
and the choice in topics is not motivated—at least not principally—by a
desire to provide exhaustive or systematic coverage of even those issues
for which Augustine is best known. Thus, a number of more prominent
elements in Augustine’s philosophy (his theory of illumination, his account of free will, his Platonism in metaphysics, to take a few examples)
go unmentioned or figure only very minimally in Matthews’s discussion,
whereas some less central, or in any case lesser-known, topics are given
considerable attention (e.g., philosophical dream problems or puzzles
about willing bad things). Not only this, but Matthews rarely attempts to
situate the particular topics he does consider vis-à-vis Augustine’s broader
views in the same area (say, Augustine’s response to skepticism vis-à-vis
his broader views in epistemology, Augustine’s account of lying vis-à-vis
his account of virtues/vices generally, Augustine’s account of wanting bad
things vis-à-vis his broader views about the nature of the will). Of course,
none of this owes to any particular failing or oversight on Matthews’s part;
it’s simply to say that this book is not that kind of introduction.

Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption and Virtue, by Jeanine Grenberg. Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. xi + 269.
Cloth $75.
PHILIP J. ROSSI, SJ, Marquette University
Jeanine Grenberg’s carefully crafted case in defense of humility as a central
human virtue starts (Chapter 1) with an account of Kantian rational agency
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in which dependency and corruption mark fundamental limits to human
moral capacities. She then oﬀers a general picture of a Kantian theory of virtue (Chapters 2 and 3) that is consonant with this construal of moral agency
as dependent and corrupt. Grenberg notes that her Kantian based view
involves at least one important contrast with Aristotelian theories—rather
than understanding virtues primarily in terms of excellences, a “Kantian
approach to virtue is . . . in part necessarily ameliorative” (p. 79)—but she
also argues for important parallels. These include both a counterpart to Aristotelian character traits, articulated in a Kantian understanding of virtues
as principled, and a Kantian thesis on behalf of the unity of the virtues.
Grenberg then oﬀers (Chapter 4) an analysis and response to recent accounts of humility (e.g., by Stephen Hare, Norvin Richards, G. F. Scheuler,
David Statman) to which her basic objection is that they “have generally
rejected any appeal to human nature to ground the state [of humility]” and,
in so doing, have turned to a “behavioristic definition of humility” that relies “upon self-other comparison as a standard for self-evaluation” (p. 111).
Her constructive account of “the Kantian virtue of humility” (Chapters 5,
6, and 7) treats it as “that meta-attitude which constitutes the moral agent’s
proper perspective on herself as a dependent and corrupt but capable and
dignified rational agent” (p. 133). A principal concern in this account is to
provide, through appeal to Kantian notions of interest, moral feeling, and
respect, a plausible alternative to “the comparative-competitive model of
humility.” In spelling out this alternative, Grenberg advances theses about
the ways in which humility and a proper self-respect regarding one’s own
moral agency mutually condition each other and argues, in addition, for
taking moral exemplars to have a more important function for moral
growth and education than is typically associated with Kant’s views. Grenberg then concludes her case by exploring (Chapters 8 and 9) “humility’s
relation to the obligatory end of perfection of self” and “how humility is
relevant to the obligatory end [i.e., beneficence] relative to others” (p. 217).
There are at least three levels on which Grenberg’s work provides bases
for significant engagement. First, it can be engaged as an exercise in virtue ethics that, by its own enactment of a modestly advanced and gently
persuasive case, not only brings humility back from the margins of discussion, but also suggests that its restoration to a more central place in the life
of the virtues is of considerable importance for truthfully undertaking the
moral responsibilities we have to ourselves and to one another. Second, it
can be engaged as an exercise in Kant interpretation that challenges once
widely accepted views that placed an almost unbridgeable chasm between
Kantian ethics as deontological and most forms of virtue ethics. Third, it
can be engaged as an exercise in moral anthropology (or a moral ontology
of human agency) which opens lines of potentially useful conversation
with theological ethics and theological anthropology. A remark about the
first level will serve as introduction to comments about the other two; the
pivotal point of engagement in all of these is Grenberg’s commitment, for
which I am in full sympathy, to provide an “account of humility [that] will
not abandon questions of human nature” (p. 111).
Both a sense of self-respect that is not keyed to comparison with others and a mutually supportive relationship between self-respect and respect for others are key elements in Grenberg’s construal of humility as

234

Faith and Philosophy

a Kantian virtue. She puts both points to eﬀective use in her necessarily compact treatment (Chapters 8 and 9) of the two main divisions of
what Kant terms “the duties of virtue,” viz., duties to oneself and duties
to others. Her engagement with these points through illustrative use of
Cordelia from King Lear and Alyosha from The Brother Karamazov shows
great sensitivity to the complexity of the human social relationships in
which humility needs to function. The latter example—Alyosha’s abortive attempt to make amends to Snegirev for the public insult inflicted
on him by Alyosha’s brother Dmitri—takes cognizance of the fact that
matters of social status and disparity of power distort both Alyosha’s
and Snegirev’s reading of what the situation demands morally in terms
of both their own self-respect and their respect for one another. Though
both are eventually able to correct their prior distorted judgments (discussed in detail on pp. 243–50) so as to act toward each other in accord
with the “humble beneficence” of moral equals, Grenberg’s account does
not raise the questions of whether or how humility in its Kantian guise
provides any purchase from which a moral agent might address the
structural social disparities that cloud proper recognition of one another
as moral equals. My suspicion is that there may be useful resources in
Grenberg’s construal of Kantian moral agency and in her mutual referencing of self-respect and respect for others to the “untrumpable value
of moral principles” (p. 161) that open possibilities for dealing with such
structural issues. It may also be the case that both identifying and utilizing those resources will require addressing the larger issues that arise in
bringing an ethics of virtue to bear upon the dynamics of shaping just
structures for human society—issues that can be posed in Kantian terms
as the task of exhibiting more explicitly what constitutes the unity of the
moral demands articulated in a “doctrine of right” with those articulated in a “doctrine of virtue” in an account of moral agency.
This consideration about the mutual relation of self-respect and respect
for others within the unity of human moral agency is relevant to the two
other levels on which Grenberg’s work deserves thoughtful engagement.
It is no longer surprising to see an interpretation of Kant’s ethics in which
concepts once taken to be outside the scope of his intense focus on right,
duty and the autonomous exercise of human freedom—e.g., teleology,
character, and virtue—are reintroduced as important coordinates within
his moral theory. Within the context of such “revisionist” readings of Kant’s
ethics, Grenberg’s particular contribution does not lie simply in its eﬀort to
provide a detailed case for taking Kant as both as an important point of
reference for general discussions of virtue and as insightful expositor of the
principles that inform a morally rich concept of humility. Of at least equal
importance in my judgment is her aﬃrmation that an account of human
agency that is conceptually and morally adequate needs to be referenced to
an understanding of human nature that is not merely empirical and behavioral. Grenberg’s interpretation is thus consonant with renewed interest a
number of Kant interpreters have recently taken in the role that anthropology plays in Kant’s critical project. It further suggests that any answer to
the question of the unity of the “doctrine of right” and the “doctrine of
virtue” will, of necessity, require an account of the human subject/agent as
the locus in which the unity of finite, embodied reason is constituted.
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This brings us full circle back to Grenberg’s starting point in Kant’s
account of finite human rational agency as dependent and corrupt that
is given its most notable exposition in Religion within the Boundaries of
Mere Reason. She articulates that account as “a general claim about the
human condition: human beings are desiring and needy beings who tend
in a whole variety of ways to value the self improperly relative to other
objects of moral value” (p. 48). In a manner that is faithful to Kant’s own
careful parsing of the diﬀerences between the moral and the religious and
between the philosophical and the theological, Grenberg tries to provide
“a philosophically respectable, and not necessarily religious, account of
a transcendent standard, and the limits of human nature in the face of
it” as the context in which to make the case for the centrality of humility
for a virtuous human life (p. 140). This careful eschewing of paths that
lead to the theological—a move that allows aﬃrmation of a “secular (at
times gentler), but always radical evil”—respects the a-theological (and
even anti-theological) perspectives informing many of the interlocutors
her work explicitly engages (p. 42).
I hope, however, that this is does not become the end of Grenberg’s
“story of dependence, corruption and virtue,” because there is reason to
think that her work oﬀers something of value for the project of constructing philosophical and theological anthropologies that can reckon with the
fractured aftermath of modernity. Grenberg makes a promising start in
the direction of providing what Charles Taylor calls an “anthropology of
situated freedom” (Sources of the Self, p. 515) in her depiction of “the challenge of the human condition” as “the task of learning to love the self
well, that is to love the self in a way that does not undermine our equally
inherent end of being moral” (p. 48). The theological crux here, of course,
is the extent to which such a properly ordered love of self is only possible
in view of first being loved by God.

The Untamed God: A Philosophical Exploration of Divine Perfection, Simplicity
and Immutability, by Jay Wesley Richards. Downer’s Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2003. 267 pp. $26.00 (paper).
JEFFREY GREEN, University of Notre Dame
Jay W. Richards’s book The Untamed God is a creative and clearly written
work that applies contemporary analytic metaphysics to the doctrines of
divine immutability and divine simplicity. As part of his exploration of
these two doctrines, Richards interacts with the work of Karl Barth and
Charles Hartshorne.
In the first chapter of the book Richards introduces classical theism and
some of the logical diﬃculties the doctrine of God faces within this traditional framework. He begins by discussing the methods classical theists use when developing accounts of God’s attributes. After reviewing
both Aquinas’s doctrine of God and Protestant Scholasticism, Richards
suggests that there is a tension in classical theism between biblical claims
about God and the doctrine of God developed by Christian scholars. In

